THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

News from the Front!

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IN THIS ISSUE!

PRAIRIE WARRIOR 94 - INSIGHTS

Initial Impressions from the Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT)

The capstone exercise for the 1994 U. S. Army Command and General Staff College students was PRAIRIE WARRIOR 94. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) formed a CAAT. The team operated under the direction of Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege (U.S. Army, Retired) to examine issues and provide insights into those issues that affect the U. S. Army.

This article will provide some of the insights that evolved from looking at the echelons above corps issues provided as a result of the Prairie Warrior link to General Headquarters Exercise 1994. This link with an Army exercise allowed for an objective view of those procedures that best support this scenario. Several scenario resource and sustainment issues follow.

DISCUSSION:

For exercise purposes, the theater CINC did not establish a separate Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), but decided to directly control the land campaign himself, working through the J3. An additional player was the 110th TAACOM, designated as the Army Component Support Command (ACSCOM). This issue was the most significant EAC issue, and the focus of this article, as it directs itself to the crucial matter of service roles in a theater of operations. Discussions in this arena are often colored by service rivalries, personal experiences and desires, and limited and vague doctrine and procedures.

The CINC provides the strategic focus to the theater, synchronizing the efforts of all the services to achieve the theater aims. Additionally, he must be looking forward to conflict termination and post-conflict activities. All these demands mitigate against the CINC also serving as the JFLCC. It is also possible that by focusing exclusively on the ground campaign, the CINC ignores the other services and neglects their requirements. This role of the "honest broker" is extremely important, balancing competing service needs while maintaining the strategic focus. The other missing element was the linkage between strategic and tactical or operational requirements. This is often an unrecognized role of the JFLCC. While the CINC maintains the strategic focus and the subordinate major unit commanders focus on operational and tactical needs, the JFLCC serves as the "bridge" between the strategic and the operational and tactical levels of war.

LESSON(S):

- The CINC can function effectively as the JFLCC with some augmentation to his headquarters. The exercise showed some degradation, although not measured, to the CINC's other duties and responsibilities. The CINC is fighting the ground war, possibly neglecting the air and sea requirements. It would be beneficial to the CINC if the J3 was also a ground commander.

- The preferable alternative is to establish a separate JFLCC to serve as the bridge between the strategic and operational and tactical levels. This position would be filled by the senior officer of the largest ground component force in the theater. Organizational details of the headquarters have not been completed. However, it appears the U. S. Army headquarters may be able to fulfill this role.

- The next Prairie Warrior exercise should increase the role play in the political, coalition and media areas to stress the CINC and his staff and test the viability of establishing the ASCC as the JFLCC. The focus should be on the staff augmentation required and the delineation of duties and responsibilities among the CINC, JFLCC, ASCC and ACSCOM.

MY OBSERVATIONS

COL Roger Spickelmier, Dir, CALL

In this issue of NFTF!, we provide initial impressions from the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), NTC Rotation 94-07 (also known as the digital rotation) and the PRAIRIE WARRIOR 94 Exercise held at Ft. Leavenworth, KS

CALL's function during these exercises and our support to the various TRADOC Battle Labs and the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) Task Force are good indicators of CALL's evolving role in the lessons learned process. While we are primarily concerned with present systems and performance, we also look to the future.

During the AWE and Exercise PRAIRIE WARRIOR, CALL provided collection expertise and, through our CTC Archive, baseline data for comparison to recent and present performance. The emphasis is on "collection expertise" and issue management.

These articles give an example of the information we are currently working. Coordinating draft reports are now out for staffing and analysis. As the lessons become understandable, we will provide more detailed information in our various products. NFTF!

COL ROGER SPICKELMIER,
DIR, CALL

NORTH WIND 94 COLD WEATHER FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE (FTX)

BILATERAL AIR SPACE MANAGEMENT

by MAJ Paul Lacusky
U. S. Army Japan, IX Corps

North Wind 94 (NW94), a bilateral cold weather winter field training exercise conducted on the northern most island, Hokkaido, Japan, met new objectives for a bilateral FTX. The 1-162d Infantry Battalion, 41st Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB), Oregon National Guard, was the major participating unit with the 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). The U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) coordinated to fly close air support (CAS) for ground operations. This coordinated effort was the first time USAF and JASDF conducted operations in support of ground forces. Both the U. S. and the JASDF Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) ground teams worked together on developing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for bilateral air to ground operations.

CAS interoperability between the United States and JGSDF has been handicapped by differences in doctrinal procedures. The joint flying of JASDF CAS alongside USAF CAS, in support of NW94 proved to be an example of the difficulty involved in coordination. Initially, the JGSDF division G3 controlled aviation assets very closely and sequentially. When jet aircraft flew missions over the maneuver area, helicopters were not permitted to fly and mortars and direct fire weapon systems were not permitted to fire.

Initially, inbound CAS was controlled down to the minute. Eventually, CAS was permitted on-station loiter times during air windows, increasing flexibility.

TACP team representatives from the Washington Air National Guard briefed both U. S. and JGSDF commanders and staff on U. S. CAS and air space management. This assisted the JGSDF in gaining an understanding and confidence in Air Space Management over the maneuver area. During the functional training phase, the TACP on the ground continually practiced dry, concurrent CAS and indirect fire missions. Training focused on target spotting, air routes of egress, and fire control techniques.

During the four-day FTX phase, USAF and JASDF flew live CAS in support of two maneuvering battalion-sized task forces on the first and last days. During the middle two days, aerial resupply missions, using the Container Delivery System (CDS), were coordinated and conducted in support of the maneuvering units. The U. S. and JGSDF air space management interoperability continues to improve.

JGSDF's cautious control measures (20 minutes between sequential activities) were loosened (to within 5-6 minutes) as USAF and JASDF TACP ground teams worked to improve times. NFTF!

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SOMALIA

by CPT Phillip R. Parker, Combat Maneuver Analyst

The integration of the CI and CA teams into the estimate and planning processes and all routine operations was a combat multiplier for the U.S. Forces in Somalia.

CI and CA teams were often employed together because they complemented each other. They were able to go into the communities with a helping hand with Medical or Dental Capabilities (MEDCAP or DENCAP). Simultaneously, they were able to develop confidences and sources for human intelligence (HUMINT). They were also able to support each other with communications and provide mutual security.

Somalia was a HUMINT-rich environment. CI teams actively conducted Low-Level Source Operations, elicitations, debriefs of Somalis, screening operations, and assisted in force protection by conducting a threat analysis with the unit intelligence officers. The databases produced as a result of these operations allowed the S2s to predict clan activity, profile areas of responsibility, answer priority intelligence requirements, determine clan boundaries and clan loyalties, identify clan and community elders and provide hard targets of threat activity to the Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

On numerous occasions, CA teams were able to defuse possible hostile situations because of the credibility they had established within the community. They also had the ability to go into the community and inform the elders and clan members about the intentions of U. S. Forces. With their reputation, as "straight shooters," the community trusted them and they were able to eliminate much of the resistance that otherwise would have existed.

It is important to note that the CA teams' reputation and credibility among the clans and clan elders were not immediate. This success was a result of repeated contacts between the CA teams and clansmen, the CA teams' clear understanding of the commanders' intent, and the commanders' support and recognition of CA capabilities.

LESSON(S): Include CA and CI teams in the staff estimate process, the staff planning process, and all routine operations. Units deploying into a theater to conduct Operations Other Than War (OOTW) must be prepared to conduct unconventional operations requiring innovative problem-solving techniques. CI and CA teams can provide valuable input into this process. NFTF!

THE DIGITAL DIFFERENCE

by Operation DESERT HAMMER-VI Analysis Cell

Elements of the 3d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Ft Benning, GA), and Task Force 1-70 Armor (Ft Knox, KY) participated in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the NTC (Operation DESERT HAMMER-VI - Rotation 94-07) from 26 March through 23 April 1994. Following is a synopsis of key lessons of the first digitally linked battalion-task force rotation at the NTC.

Doctrine

TF 1-70 possessed 33 vehicles that could digitially call for fire (M1A2s, Intra-Vehicle Information System (IVIS) Bradleys and FIST-Vs). As a result of the number of potential observers, the number of calls for fire increased dramatically. If uncontrolled, this capability can cause fire support management problems. Fire support officers must be prepared for greater quantities of calls for fire within a given time.

The rotation reinforced the fundamental requirement for proper reconnaissance and appreciation for the battlefield. All source intelligence systems allow better threat integration, but require the unit staff to analyze large quantities of information in a short time. All available intelligence and reconnaissance assets must be completely integrated into the task force plan.

Digital battle command provides the commander with a better understanding of the battlefield. TF 1-70 made increased use of limited visibility conditions (night, smoke, poor weather), particularly using smoke during breaching operations. Position Navigation (POSNAV) and the IVIS allowed for solid maneuver in these conditions, while the enemy's acquisition and movement were degraded.

Training

Digital units are integrated across battlefield operating systems; therefore, there is a need to stress combined arms training. In addition, conducting external evaluations at all echelons prior to training at the NTC ensures the unit's trainup is focused. Training strategies must include a mix of both field and simulation training. This will prevent the loss of field skills.

Digital systems have changed workload distribution, created some new tasks and modified other tasks. Therefore, digital training of leaders and individuals requires new methods. Digital training needs to be incorporated into institutional instruction and formalized within the unit. This will assist soldiers in understanding how and when to use digital equipment.

Leadership

Force XXI Battle Command offers leaders many potential enhancements to their warfighting capability. Among these enhancements are:
1) quicker reaction times through accurate and timely dissemination of FRAGOs and warning orders (accompanied by digital overlays).
2) improved situational awareness of friendly and enemy forces
3) an improved parallel planning process.

Leaders must be trained not only in new system specific tasks, such as preparing overlays and reports, but also must understand how to integrate their digital capabilities into their other troop-leading procedures.

Organization

The organization change that most affected TF 1-70 AR was the introduction of the Battle Command Vehicle (BCV). The concept for this vehicle was to use it as the TF commander's primary C2 vehicle and possibly replace the TOC completely. However, the TF commander used it only when his primary vehicle (M1A2) was designated a combat loss. This caused the TF staff to be split between the TF TOC and the BCV. There is a need to clarify the role of the BCV.

Materiel

The major insight from the rotation is that digital systems should make the task "no more difficult than it is now." If a system adds tasks or makes the job more difficult, it will not be used. Digital equipment requires a very simple human interface for operation on the move. Large, distinct buttons and touch-sensitive screens were the most common remedies suggested by soldiers.

Vehicle commanders and higher level leaders have a very limited time to view their screens and process information. The digital systems must contain as much information as possible on the screen. Color screens that differentiate friendly, templated enemy and actual enemy locations would be extremely beneficial.

The majority of tank commanders requested the IVIS display be changed so it could be viewed by glancing down when the TC operated in the open hatch mode. A heads-up display (HUD) was suggested as a possible solution.

Leaders at all levels relied on both their paper map and the digital system. During planning, leaders were often dismounted and needed their display case at hand. A digital display portraying the current map and a portable mapcase would be very useful.

Soldiers

Soldiers expressed confidence in using digital technology. However, they believe additional training and more hands-on use would have benefited operations prior to the rotation. It was generally accepted that higher intelligence by the soldier is not required. However, efficient and effective training is a necessity to operate the equipment.

Conclusions: Digital battle command systems allow the U. S. Army to better execute current doctrine. At this point, fundamental changes in doctrine have not been identified. There are indications of small changes that will be varied and widespread. Each new digital system presents new TTPs that alter the way soldiers, leaders, and units fight. There is undoubtedly a capability for a new approach to warfighting.

Look for an expanded version of this article in the next CALL CTC Bulletin. NFTF!

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

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